Economic inquiry into the relationship between self and God in Judeo-Christian theology by Muller, Edward Nicholas, IV, 1964-
IS GOD AN ECONOMIST? AN ECONOMIC INQUIRY INTO THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF AND GOD IN
JUDEa-CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
by
EDWARD NICHOLAS MULLER, IV
A DISSERTATION
Presented to the Department ofEconomics
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
December 2009
11
University of Oregon Graduate School
Confirmation of Approval and Acceptance of Dissertation prepared by:
Edward Muller
Title:
"Is God An Economist? An Economic Inquiry into the Relationship Between Self and God in
Judeo-Christian Theology"
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Economics by:
Joe Stone, Co-Chairperson, Economics
Jo Anna Gray, Co-Chairperson, Economics
Larry Singell, Member, Economics
Jean Stockard, Outside Member, Planning Public Policy & Mgmt
and Richard Linton, Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies/Dean of the Graduate
School for the University of Oregon.
December 12,2009
Original approval signatures are on file with the Graduate School and the University of Oregon
Libraries.
© 2009 Edward Nicholas Muller, IV
111
IV
An Abstract of the Dissertation of
Edward Nicholas Muller, IV
in the Department of Economics
for the degree of
to be taken
Doctor of Philosophy
December 2009
Title: IS GOD AN ECONOMIST? AN ECONOMIC INQUIRY INTO THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF AND GOD IN JUDEO-CHRISTIAN
THEOLOGY
Approved:
Dr. Joe Stone, Co-Chair
Approved:
Dr. JoAnna Gray, Co-Chair
In the context of Judeo-Christian theology, I develop what appears to be the first
formal economic model to analyze the joint interactions between human actors and a
divine actor involved in the production of good works. Human actors are identified as
trusting believers, doubting believers, or nonbelievers. The divine actor is perceived as
offering four different alternative contracts, an ex ante contract without a penalty, an ex
post contract, an ex ante contract with a penalty, and a covenant. Contract types are
identified with specific religious affiliations. The amount of good works produced
depends on the strength of faith and the contractual choices of the individual, as implied
by religious affiliation. I test explicit predictions ofthe model using individual survey
data from a nationally representative sample. My results suggest that (1) ex post contracts
"work" (attendance is greater for trusting believers under ex post contracts than under ex
ante contracts without a penalty); (2) strength of faith does not matter (good works are
equivalent for both trusting and doubting believers under ex ante contracts); (3) penalties
do not "work" for believers (attendance is no greater for believers under ex ante contracts
with a penalty than under ex ante contracts without a penalty); and (4) covenants "work"
(attendance is the same for believers under covenants as under ex ante contracts without a
penalty). Tests focus either on the model's counterintuitive predictions for the role of
strength of faith/or a given contract type or on the role of religious affiliation and
contract type for a given strength of faith. The tests suggest substantial power for the
model's predictions. Even so, the dissertation emphasizes throughout the limitations of a
purely economic analysis of the Judeo-Christian tradition and theology.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Few aspects of human behavior have escaped the scrutiny of economic analysis in
recent decades. Religion is no exception. Social scientists, more broadly, have long
examined the relationship of economic behavior and religion. Some have looked at how
economic conditions influence religious beliefs and practices, while others have explored
the ways in which religion influences economic behaviors. The vast majority of this
literature has been within sociology, but economists have recently explored this area as
well. In some cases, scholars in economics have joined together with scholars in
sociology to examine the relationship between religious affiliation and religious
participation. Stark, Iannaccone, and Finke have examined the "secularization" of
Europe (1994, 230), the economics of church and state (1997), and the relationship
between religion, science, and rationality (2001, 433). Sherkat has examined religious
affiliation and religious mobility (2001) as well as religious orientation and participation
(1998).
The church-sect distinction, in particular, has long attracted the attention of social
scientists. Max Weber introduced the distinction in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century (1904). The sociologist Benton Johnson developed adapted theoretical
clarifications in mid-century (Johnson, 1957,1963,1971). More recently, Iannaccone
introduced the concepts to the field of economics (1998, 1465). In a recent survey,
2Iannaccone (1998, 1465) notes that more than 200 articles have been published on the
economics of religion, examining everything from free riding in religious groups and
strategies for deterring free riding-for example, strict codes of behavior, dress, or
belief-to the relationship between religious beliefs, religious participation, and
economic outcomes, as well as the relationship going in the other direction from
economic behavior and outcomes to religious beliefs and identity.
Despite the emergence of such an extensive literature on the economics of
religion, a literature that dates back as far as Adam Smith (Wealth ofNations 5.1.3.3),
some of the most fundamental questions in religion remain unexamined by economists.
For example, what is the relationship between self and God? How does our perception of
that relationship affect behavior? This study proposes to answer these questions based on
key elements of Judeo-Christian theology, expressed in terms of standard microeconomic
methods of analysis. My goal is not to argue for a particular theological view of God but
to understand how beliefs about God affect economic outcomes. While I am ultimately
interested in beliefs in all religious traditions, I begin here with one, the Judeo-Christian
tradition. Consequently, I propose a series of economic models of the relationship
between self and God that employ standard microeconomic methods to capture major
archetypes in the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Several points should be clarified from the start. First, I use notions of
humanity's perception of God and God as an entity interchangeably. Similarly, I use the
terms humanity and self interchangeably. Third, while some may find the application of
economic methods to religion distasteful or even offensive, neither is my intention. The
3title of my dissertation, "Is God an Economist?" is inspired by the provocative book
"God the Economist" (Meeks, 1999).
Here, I take seriously some of the implications of assuming that God is an
economist- in Becker's sense of maximizing behavior based on utility functions and
constraints. This exploration of what it might mean if God were an economist, while
obviously not meant literally, does provide I believe, new insights from an economic
perspective by identifying key theoretical predictions for the link between religious
beliefs and behavior. The use of explicit theoretical models to derive predictions for
behavior and the application of empirical tests of those predictions distinguish this study
from Meeks (1989).
Despite an extensive literature on the economics of religion, much controversy
still surrounds the nature and strength of the links between religious beliefs and economic
behavior and outcomes (Mange1oja (2003». Some studies suggest that such links are
negligible. For example, an early study by Long and Settle, finds no link between
wealth, income or age, and religious attendance (1977, 410). Similarly, Tomes also finds
no link (1985, 247). Gruber notes the enormous difficulty in parsing out any causal
relationships between religious participation and economic behavior or consequences
(2005, 1). Factors that affect religiosity are also likely to affect outcomes and unobserved
heterogeneity is likely present due to the correlation between religiosity and individual
attributes such as ambition, ability, and intelligence. Indeed, the range and variability of
empirical findings illustrate this problem. The seminal study by Azzi and Ehrenberg
(1975, 40) demonstrates that church attendance is positively related to wealth, but
4negatively related to income. Hause reports that average earnings of Catholics are greater
than non-Catholics (1971,291), and Chiswick finds that the earnings of Jews are greater
than the earnings of non-Jews (1983, 321). Neumann finds that time spent in religious
activity follows a U-shaped pattern with respect to the wage rate (1986, 1197). Glaeser
and Glendon find some support for Weber's hypothesis (1904) that Protestant affiliation
is associated with greater economic success than Catholic affiliation (1998, 431).
In a recent review of the literature, Iannaccone (1998) notes a number of studies
that indicate a link between religious affiliation and economic outcomes, but the direction
of causality is usually unclear, in part due to the paucity oftheoretical structures that
yield clear empirical predictions. I apply standard microeconomic methods to sharpen
predictions for economic behavior, contingent on measures of religious belief, and then
apply empirical tests ofthose predictions.
A number of other recent studies have examined the links between religious
affiliation and economic outcomes. Lipford and Tollison find that increased religious
participation is associated with lower levels of income (2003, 254). Lehrer and Chiswick
find that marriages where both partners have a common religious affiliation are more
likely to be stable than marriages where both partners do not have a religious affiliation
or marriages where both partners have a different religious affiliation (2004,400). Steen
(2004) finds that religious background is related to marital choices, educational choices,
and earnings, and that men raised as Catholics or Jews have higher earnings than men
raised as Protestants.
5Bloomberg, et.al. review Barrow and McCleary (2003), Glaeser (2005), Gruber
(2005), Jeitschko, O'Connell, Pecchenino (2005), and Deheija et. al. (2005), among
others (2006, 3). These studies demonstrate empirical links between religious affiliation,
religious participation, and outcomes such as economic growth, voting, educational
attainment, income, marriage, dependence on social programs, physical and mental
health, and lifetime consumption. The latter study provides a theoretical relationship
between religion and utility using standard life-cycle consumption theory. Bloomberg et.
al. test this model and find that religious individuals do increase their religious giving
patterns as the probability of death increases (2006, 28).
A problem common to all these studies is that religious affiliation is neither
sufficiently defined in economic terms, nor linked to particular behavior or outcomes
through a formal theoretical structure. In particular, Iannaccone notes that economists do
not have much to say about beliefs (1998, 1491). One way ofmodeling beliefs and
religious affiliation is to introduce both a human utility function and a divine utility
function in which the arguments are related. To date, only two works have modeled
divine preferences and only one work has modeled both divine and human utility.
The first work, a book by Brams (1980), models divine preferences, but does not
give them an explicit representation. Briefly, God values beliefover non-belief, tests
humans by giving them genuine choices in which humans may renege on promises, and
imposes constraints on human activity. The second work, by Oslington (2005), expresses
individual utility as a function ofvarious commodities and God's utility as a different
function of the same commodities. For Oslington, the basic problem is divergent
6valuation of commodities; faith is implicit and expresses itself in conformity of choices to
the divine will.
The formal approach of this study more closely matches Oslington's work in that
God engages in maximizing behavior and gains utility from the 'commodity' of human
good works. While the model is less general than that employed by Oslington, it goes
beyond Oslington's work by asking if alternative contractual (i.e. religious) arrangements
between God and humanity produce different levels of human welfare, and by applying
formal tests of the model's predictions. I consider four arrangements: three contracts and
a 'covenant.' I test explicit predictions ofthese models using individual survey data.
The theoretical model is set out in Chapter II, and predictions from the model are
tested in Chapter III. Chapter IV concludes. A scriptural background for the theoretical
model is set out in Appendix F.
7CHAPTER II
THE MODEL
Assumptions
For both God and an individual human, behavior follows the standard economic
paradigm - each is characterized as an optimizing agent subject to constraints.
Human Utility
Individuals act to maximize utility, which depends positively on consumption (C)
and production of good works (G), as described in equation (1) below. Equation (1) also
contains a term V, which is determined by God. This term represents the possibility of a
direct, "divine" augment to human utility, as discussed further in the next section on
contracts and outcomes. Individuals maximize a utility function of the form:
(1) u == C +hG + V
C may be produced with human labor or provided by God as a gift or reward. Human
production of C (CH) is subject to a linear (constant returns to scale) relationship between
the amount oflabor (time or effort) a human devotes to producing goods (Lc) and the
amount of the consumption good produced (CH). The parameter () measures human
productivity in producing the consumption good:
(2)
8Good Works
Good works (G) can only be produced using human labor. Labor devoted directly
to good works (La) and labor devoted to producing consumption (Lc) are complements in
producing good works. Positive inputs into both goods production and good works
production are necessary for good works to be performed. The inputs can be thought of
as complements in the sense that work and rest or work and food are complements in
producing "effective" labor time.
(3)
(4)
Finally, in choosing La and Lc, a human may not exceed the total amount of time
available, denoted L (e.g., 24 hours a day).
LG +Lc =L
God's Utility and Actions with Respect to Humanity
God uses (or equivalently, human believers think God uses) three instruments to
affect individual behavior-rewards (b), penalties (T), and "gifts" (V). The "gift" is a
direct divine augment to utility. God may chose to reward humans for labor devoted to
good works. The reward for good works is in the form of consumption (C), and for
simplicity, is assumed to take the linear form,
(5)
The parameter b indicates the "price" God promises to pay for time devoted to good
works, and Ca denotes the total consumption promised by God in exchange for time
spent in good works.
9God may penalize humans who renege on their promises. The penalty, T, takes
the form of a lump-sum reduction in C. Finally, God may choose to make gifts to
humanity (V, explained below) which directly increase human utility.
Individual humans, indexed by i, are perceived to contribute positively to God's
welfare through the performance of good works. God is perceived to suffer disutility
from administering penalties instead of gifts. For convenience, the utility God associates
with individual i, nj, is equal to the good works produced by the individual less a
constant term e which is positive and finite if God must use a penalty. God is not able to
influence the index, i.
(6) 0; =G;-& fori=I, .... ,N.
Unless it is needed for notational clarity, the subscript i is omitted in what
follows.
Believers and Nonbelievers
Humans are born as either believers or nonbelievers. Believers are born as either
trusting or doubting. Those who trust believe God's promises, whereas doubters do not
trust in God's promises but believe in God. All believers may renege on their promises if
given the right incentive.
Consequences ofGod's Actions
The consequences differ for believers and nonbelievers. For believers, total
human consumption, C, is not limited to goods produced with human labor, C = 8(Lc),
but also includes rewards from God for time committed to goods works, CG = b(LG), less
penalties (T) for reneging on agreements with God. That is,
10
(7)
For nonbelievers, individual consumption is,
(8)
Information
Without cost, God observes each human's status as a believer or nonbeliever,
utility functions, and actual behavior. Furthermore, God understands the basis for human
action - optimization subject to resource constraints - and the effect that divine rewards
and gifts will have on human behavior. Humans believe that God offers alternative
arrangements to humanity knowing that believers will maximize utility subject to the
terms of an arrangement. Individuals evaluate God's offer based on whether they trust
God's promises, respond to God with promises of their own, and make time/resource
allocation decisions. These may depend on God's choice of reward (b) and gift (V) in the
case of believers, but will be independent of those choices in the case of nonbelievers.
Individuals can only observe the utility of others who accept the same type of contract.
Payoffs are realized after decisions are complete.
Contracts and Outcomes
I consider four arrangements God offers (or again, human believers think God
offers) to induce humans to increase good works. Again, I use God and human
perceptions of God interchangeably. Empirically, these contractual offers are identified
with particular religious affiliations.
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Ex post Contracts
Under' ex post' contracts, rewards are conditional on observed individual actions
and delivered ex post if the tenus of the contract are kept. Under an ex post contract God
promises to pay a "price" b for each unit oflabor spent on good works. Trusting
believers, doubting believers, and nonbelievers respond to the offer in different ways.
God solves the following problem:
Max n == L G; subject to L G = L~ where L~ solves the maximization problem for
trusting believers which can be written as
Max U= C+hG
LG,LC
S.t.
LG+Lc=L
CH=bLc
CG=bLG
C=CH+CG
G=L(L-LG)
The first order conditions for an interior maximum for trusting believers are:
dU
- = 0 =b-o +(h)L-2(h)LGdLG
This yields an interior optimum:
LH == L +_(b_-_o--,---)
G 2 2h
LH == L _ (b-o)
E 2 2h
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These ex post contracts for trusting believers may be substituted into God's problem and
the first order conditions obtained. The first order condition with respect to b is
dO. _ 0 _ 1 b-o
-- -----
db 2 h 2
Doubting believers, who do not trust God's promises, and nonbelievers, who do
not believe a consumption reward exists, are unresponsive. This means that neither party
responds to God's promise with additional time spent in good works; the first order
condition for an interior maximum for doubting believers and nonbelievers does not
contain b:
dU
- =0 = -0 +(h)L - 2(h)LGdL G
This yields an interior optimum:
A comer solution results if (0/ h) > L. If 0/ h, the ratio ofthe marginal
productivity ofLe in producing C to the marginal utility of good works is sufficiently
high, doubting believers and nonbelievers will set LG, the input into good works, at 0, and
Le, the input into production of C, at L. Outcomes of ex post contracts are summarized
below for trusting believers, doubting believers, and nonbelievers.
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Table 1. Ex post Contracts.
Trusting Believers
(8/h)<L
L = L
G 2
b=8
L2G=-
4
U = 8L + hL
2
4
n =~ L2
B '7 4
Doubting Believers and Nonbelievers
(8/h)<L
General observations for ex post contracts
• Strength of faith matters. Good works rise as strength of faith rises. Trusting
believers respond to God's promise by putting more resources into good works than
either doubting believers or nonbelievers. This leads to increased utility for trusting
believers relative to doubting believers.
• Likeness to God matters. h measures likeness to God in the following sense: Given
an interior solution, humanity's marginal valuation of what God values (good works)
is higher for a greater value ofh. The table indicates that for greater likeness to God,
good works are higher and both divine and individual utility are higher. If likeness to
God is near infinity, both doubting believers and nonbelievers come close to the input
into good works for trusting believers. They are 'close to the kingdom.'
• Doubting believers and nonbelievers are both unresponsive.
• Doubt and disbelief are equivalent. Doubting believers are no better off than
nonbelievers. They are both unresponsive and make equivalent choices.
• God optimizes. God optimizes by setting b= 8 .
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• God is better off when people have faith in his promises. The presence of faith leads
to increased good works which increases God's utility.
Ex ante Contracts without a Penalty
Because only trusting believers respond to God's promises under an ex post
contract, God offers 'ex ante' contracts in which rewards are offered ex ante with a price
conditional on the promise of future performance. Ex ante contracts can be with or
without a penalty. In an ex ante contract without a penalty, God offers consumption 'up
front' inducing doubting believers to enter into the contract. Trusting and doubting
believers behave equivalently in the absence of a penalty. In particular, all believers
have an incentive to renege on promises and reduce good works, consuming 'up front'
and then devoting additional labor to own production of consumption. Thus, all
believers gain additional consumption by reneging on good works, and the first order
conditions and solutions are now identical for all individuals.
dU
dL = 0 = -0 + (h)L - 2(h)LG
G
J!l =L_!-
G 2 2h
J!l=L+~
E 2 2h
The results for contracts with rewards delivered ex ante are given in the following table
for interior solutions.
Table 2. Ex ante Contracts without a Penalty.
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Trusting Believers
Doubting Believers
(8/h)<L
L 8L =---
G 2 2h
b=8
L 2 8 2G=---
4 4h 2
U = 8L + hL
2
4
L2 8 2QD=~4-4h2
Nonbelievers
(8/h)<L
L 8L =---
G 2 2h
L 2 8 2G=---
4 4h 2
8L hL2 8 2U=-+--+-
2 4 4h
L2 8 2
Q ND =~ 4- 4h 2
General observations for ex ante contracts without a penalty
• Strength of faith does not matter. Doubting believers behave as
trusting believers. Good works are the same for trusting believers,
doubting believers, and nonbelievers.
• Ex ante contracts without a penalty "don't work". Trusting believers
renege and reduce good works relative to ex post contracts.
• Likeness to God still matters in ex ante contracts. As h approaches
infinity, good works for trusting believers, doubting believers, and
nonbelievers all approach the ex post amount for trusting believers.
• Doubting believers are better off than nonbelievers. Since doubting
believers take God's ex ante contract and then renege, they are better
off than nonbelievers who remain unresponsive.
Ex ante Contracts with a Penalty
Knowing that humans likely will renege on ex ante contracts, God invokes a
penalty for reneging on good works. This penalty induces believers to keep their
promises and increase good works to meet the terms of the contract. Under this
16
arrangement, all believers are now responsive to God's promises. However, God's utility
is reduced through the imposition ofthis penalty. Outcomes are summarized in table 3
assuming the penalty is high enough to induce trusting and doubting believers to change
the time spent in good works to LG =L /2 .
Table 3. Ex ante Contracts with a Penalty.
Trusting Believers
Doubting Believers
L -!::...-~
G - 2 2h
b=5
L2G=-
4
hL2 52
U =5L+-+--T
4 4h
L 2Q ="--&
B 7' 4
Nonbelievers
L 5L ----
G 2 2h
L2 52
G=---
4 4h 2
5L hL2 52
U=-+--+-
2 4 4h
L2 52
Q NB = ~ 4- 4h 2
General observations for ex ante contracts with a penalty
• Strength of faith does not matter. Doubting believers behave like trusting believers.
All believers exhibit the same amount of good works.
• Penalties "work." All believers produce more good works than under an ex ante
contract without a penalty.
• Likeness to God matters. The table indicates for greater likeness to God, good works
are higher and divine and human utility is higher. Iflikeness to God is near infinity,
doubting believers and nonbelievers behave more like trusting believers in terms of
good works.
• All believers are better off. Believers receive additional utility through both a
higher amount of good works and an additional source of consumption.
• The effect on God's utility is indeterminate. The additional good works increase
God's utility, but the penalty reduces God utility.
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• As usual, nonbelievers are unresponsive. Nonbelievers' choices lead to reduced good
works.
Covenants
Although God solves the problem of reneging through an ex ante contract with a
penalty, the penalty itself reduces God's utility. Hence, God offers a 'covenant '-a
direct divine augment to utility which is offered conditional on 'transforming faith', that
is, faith which is sufficient to preclude reneging. If this direct augment to utility is
sufficiently high, both trusting and doubting believers will produce the same amount of
good works as under an ex ante contract with a penalty. Theoretical results for table 4
follow.
Table 4. Covenants.
Trusting Believers
Doubting Believers
(o/h)<L
L
L G =-2
b=5
L 2
G ==
4
hL2U =5L+--+V
4
n =" ~
B L.: 4
Nonbelievers
(o/h)<L
L 5LG = ---2 2h
L2 52
G=---
4 4h 2
5L hL2 52
U=-+--+-
2 4 4h
L2 52
n NB = ~ 4- 4h2
General observations for covenants
• Covenants "work." Ifbelievers experience transforming faith, they
produce the same amount of good works as under an ex ante contract
with a penalty.
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• Trusting and doubting believers are at least as well off under the
covenant (for V> (8 2 / 4h )). Both trusting and doubting believers
possess transfonning faith which is sufficient to make them at least as
well off as under an ex ante contract with a penalty.
• Utility is higher for believers. Believers are better off than
nonbelievers given an interior solution.
Summary and Predictions
The problem with an ex post contract is that doubting believers do not respond to
God's promises and do not enter into the contract. This problem is solved by an ex ante
contract: God's offer of consumption up front induces doubting believers to enter into
the ex ante contract. However, an ex ante contract without a penalty produces reneging.
One solution to the problem of reneging under an ex ante contract without a penalty is an
ex ante contract with a penalty. Under an ex ante contract with a penalty, all believers
take the reward ex ante and do not renege because the magnitude of the penalty is set just
high enough to prevent reneging. God's welfare is thus higher under this contract than
the previous two contracts if the reduction in God's welfare due to the penalty is
sufficiently small.
Another arrangement deals with the problem of reneging directly rather than
through a penalty. God accomplishes this through a covenant. For a sufficiently large
gift based on 'transfonning' faith (V> 8 2 / 4h ), believers will be at least as well off as
under an ex ante contract with a penalty. Here, transfonning faith is defined as faith that
precludes reneging. A number of predictions can be made based upon this analysis:
19
• Ex ante contracts without a penalty "don't work" in that all believers are likely to
renege. Trusting believers reduce good works under an ex ante contract without a
penalty relative to an ex post contract.
• Under ex ante contracts, good works do not increase as strength of faith increases.
Under an ex ante contract without a penalty, doubting believers behave like
trusting believers because God's provision of consumption is 'up front.' All
believers subsequently renege. Under an ex ante contract with a penalty,
believers respond by increasing good works. Thus, under ex ante contracts, good
works are equivalent for doubting and trusting believers.
• Ex ante contracts with penalties "work," in that under an ex ante contract with a
penalty, believers produce more good works than under an ex ante contract
without a penalty.
• Covenants "work." Under a covenant, with a sufficiently high divine augment,
believers respond with transforming faith and produce the same amount of good
works as under an ex ante contract with a penalty.
In the following chapter, I test four predictions based upon self reported strength
of faith and contract type, as identified by religious affiliation, religious donations and
attendance, and other standard demographic controls.
(1) Ex ante contracts without a penalty "don't work," in that all believers are
likely to renege, (2) under ex ante contracts, good works do not increase as strength of
faith increases, (3) ex ante contracts with penalties "work," in that believers produce
more good works under an ex ante contract with a penalty than under an ex ante contract
without a penalty, and (4) covenants "work," in that believers produce the same amount
of good works as under an ex ante contract with a penalty.
20
CHAPTER III
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
Empirical Background and Specification
In this chapter, I present empirical tests of the model described in chapter II. In
this section, I provide some background for the empirical specification used in the tests
and a rationale for grouping particular religious sects together and identifying groups
with one of the four types of contracts. Section B describes the data, section C follows
with the empirical specification used in the model, section D gives empirical results, and
section E concludes.
Iannaccone (1998, 1) notes that nearly 95% of Americans believe in the existence
of God or a universal spirit, nearly 60% of Americans attend church, an increase of26%
from the mid-1800's, and a large percentage ofthese believe in heaven, hell, the afterlife,
and the divinity of Jesus. Moreover, in Iannaccones' church-sect typology, beliefs,
attendance, and contributions are positively correlated with religious conservatism,
strictness, and sectarianism. With regard to religious contributions, Iannaccone finds that
liberal Protestant denominations give approximately 1.5% of income, conservative
Protestant denominations such as Southern Baptists and the Assemblies of God give
between 2 and 4% of income, and Mormons give approximately 6%.
Why does the church-sect typology take this shape? Azzi and Ehrenberg's
seminal study (1975) suggests that expected afterlife rewards may be higher for 'strict'
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conservative cohorts and may result in increased attendance and contributions. Some
have suggested that this typology may be a result of "addictive" (in the Becker sense)
effects of religion; 'strict' conservative groups acquire greater amounts of religious
human capital than liberal cohorts which results in higher attendance and contributions.
Other studies have looked at churches as firms and churches as clubs to address this
question. Whatever one may conclude in the aggregate, from an individual choice
perspective it seems clear that typological differences arise because ofvariations in
religious beliefs and practices.
The model of the previous section suggests that an individual's investment in
good works may vary with both the strength of individuals' beliefs about God's existence
and trustworthiness, and the type of relationship, i.e. 'contract', God appears to offer.
Ideally, one would examine the model's predictions using panel or time-series data. Such
data are still quite limited, so I follow Iannaccone, and use cross sectional data.
Key to my analysis is the notion that variation in giving to one's religion is
positively and systematically related to the overall level of good works produced by
individuals. Following Iannaccone, I use religious donations and attendance to measure
good works (1998, 1472). I define the dependent variable, good works, in two different
ways. First, I use the proportion of giving to income, a measure which incorporates the
notion of sacrifice. Second, I use the approximate percentage of yearly attendance
measured in weeks. The right hand side variables consist of variables capturing strength
of belief, beliefs about the divine contract, and the interaction between the two. I am
particularly interested in the interaction between the two, because a comparison of
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interaction terms will form the basis for the empirical tests of my model predictions. To
capture strength of faith, the specification includes binary variables identifying trusting
believers (TRSBEL), doubting believers (DBTBEL), and nonbelievers (NONBEL), as
identified from self-response survey data. Also, individuals self-report (via religious
affiliation) the type of contract that they believe God offers: that is, an ex post contract
(EXPST), an ex ante contract (EXANT) or a covenant (COV). In addition, for
individuals who believe God offers an ex ante contract, it is possible for one of the years
of the survey (1991, see below), to determine the type of ex ante contract they believe
God offers based on self-reporting about belief in the devil. In particular, God offers an
ex ante contract without a penalty (EXAWP) to those with a negative response to belief
in the devil and an ex ante contract with a penalty (EXPEN) to those with an affirmative
response.
To permit tests of the model's hypotheses, I also include a large number of terms
interacting faith with contractual type. Trusting and doubting believers may enter into ex
post contracts (TREXP, DBEXP), ex ante contracts without a penalty (TRXWP,
DBXWP), ex ante contracts with a penalty (TRPEN, DBPEN), and covenants (TRCOV,
DBCOV). The omitted category for belief is nonbelievers, for contract is no contract,
and for interactions are all interactions involving either nonbelievers or no contract.
Variable definitions are provided in Table 5 below (p. 29).
The full model is designed to test the model's hypotheses, parameterized as
interactions between strength of faith and religious contracts. In the year where I can
distinguish between ex ante contracts with a penalty and ex ante contracts without a
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penalty, the base specification includes variables for trusting and doubting believers,
religious "contracts", and eight interaction terms. In 1988, where I only have one ex ante
contract and cannot distinguish between ex ante contracts with a penalty and ex ante
contracts without a penalty, I specify a reduced model, using three religious contract
variables and six interactions, which permits tests ofa subset of the model's hypotheses.
I assess the robustness of my base results specification that includes an extensive set of
controls such as income, religious experience, race, gender, marital status, employment,
family background, and residence (cf. Tomes' use ofGSS data).
The objective of this chapter is to test the model's predictions. The hypotheses
are explained below in terms of the empirical specification.
Hypothesis 1
Ex ante contracts without a penalty "don't work." That is, trusting
believers under ex ante contracts produce fewer good works relative to the ex
post contract. [TREXP>TRXWP; TREXP>TREXAl
Hypothesis 2
Under ex ante contracts, good works do not increase as strength of faith increases
since doubting believers behave as trusting believers (ceteris paribus). All believers
exhibit the same amount of good works under equivalent ex ante contracts.
[TRXWP=DBXWP; TRPEN=DBPEN; TREXA=DBEXA] This test is a particularly
powerful one, in that the model's predictions run counter to common intuition that good
works should rise with strength of faith.
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Hypothesis 3
Penalties "work." That is, under an ex ante contract with a penalty, all
believers produce more good works than under an ex ante contract without a
penalty. [TRPEN>TRXWP; DBPEN>DBXWP]
Hypothesis 4
Covenants "work." That is, under a covenant, believers produce the same
amount of good works relative to an ex ante contract with a penalty.
[TRCOY=TRPEN; DBCOY=DBPEN]
To test these hypotheses, it is important for the data to distinguish between
strength of faith and contractual types. The GSS data includes a question that directly
addresses differences in strength of faith. However, there is no question concerning
'contractual' preferences. To deal with this problem, I extend the approach of
Iannaccone, who distinguishes between liberal Protestants, conservative Protestants, and
Catholics.
I proceed by identifying Catholics with ex post contracts, liberal Protestants and
Jews with ex ante contracts, and conservative Protestants with covenants. I identify a
liberal Protestant or Jew who does not believe in the devil with an ex ante contract
without a penalty. I identify a liberal Protestant or Jew who does believe in the devil with
an ex ante contract with a penalty. A complete listing of contractual variables by
religious/denominational type is given in Appendix B.
This way of distinguishing between contracts is not without precedent. Glaeser
and Glendon (1998) effectively identify Catholicism with ex post contracts in which good
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works are motivated by a future reward, "getting into heaven." There is some historical
precedent as well for this distinction; at the time of the Reformation, Protestants
distinguished themselves from Catholics by stressing the importance of transforming
faith and need for covenants rather than ex post contracts. Similarly, liberal
Protestantism is associated with higher critical biblical scholarship which is most
consistent with ex ante contracts where God needs to demonstrate promises 'up front' to
motivate acceptance of the contract.
Based on the above discussion, I estimate a full model from a sample with
information on strength ofbeliefs, giving, denominational/religious preferences, and
penalties:
G~ = fJO + fJlRSBELi + fJ2DBTBELi + fJ3EXPSTf + fJ5EXA WIf
+fJ6EXPENi +fJ7CO~ + fJ8TREXIf + fJlOTRXWIj +
+fJIITRPENi +fJ12TRCO~ + fJ13DBEXIf +
fJ14DBXWIj + fJ15DBPENi + fJ16DBCOVi + ci
where TRSBEL j and DBTBELi are strength of faith variables for trusting and doubting
believers, EXPSTi, EXAWPj, EXPENi, and COVj are contractual variables for ex post
contracts, ex ante contracts without a penalty, ex ante contracts with a penalty, and
covenants, and the remaining variables interact strength of faith and contracts. The
contract types are estimated relative to the omitted category, no contract; strength of faith
is estimated relative to nonbelievers, the omitted strength of faith category (regardless of
the presence or absence of a category); and the interactions are estimated relative to all
interactions involving either nonbelievers or no contract.
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For the full model, I test four key hypotheses.
Hypothesis l: ~8> ~10
Hypothesis 2: ~1O=~14; ~11=~15
Hypothesis 3: ~11> ~1O; ~15> ~14
Hypothesis 4: ~12=~I1; ~16= ~15
The reduced model is as follows:
G~ = fJo + fJlTRSBELi + fJ2DBTBELi + fJ3EXPS1f + fJ4EXAN1f
+fJ7CO~ + fJ8TREXIj + fJ9TREXAi +fJ12TRCO~ + fJ13DBEXIj +
fJ14DBEXAi + fJ17DBCOVi + Gi
where the variables are the same as in the full model except for EXANTj, a contractual
variable for ex ante contracts (regardless of the presence or absence of a penalty). The
two hypotheses I test using the reduced model are:
Hypothesis 1: ~8> ~9
Hypothesis 2: ~9=~14
Tests of hypothesis 1 in the reduced model are only a crude and imperfect
approximation of the prediction that trusting believers under ex post contracts produce
more good works than under ex ante contracts without a penalty. Due to limitations of
the data, the actual test is whether trusting believers under ex post contracts produce more
good works than under ex ante contracts with or without a penalty.
The principal data source is the National Opinion Research Center's General Social
Surveys, a survey which has b~en conducted from 1972 through the present. The data from
the survey are independently drawn from approximately 1500 personal interviews with
English speaking, non-institutionalized people aged 18 or over. In addition to questions
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concerning religious preferences, which were asked over the entire period, the survey asked
a variety of specific questions for the years 1988 and 1991 concerning the degree of trust in
God, attendance, religious giving, and belief in heaven, hell, and the devil. My analysis
restricts the data set to the years 1988 and 1991 because only 1991 pennits a test ofthe full
specification of the model and only 1991 and 1988 pennit a complementary test of the
reduced model.
Tests focus either on the model's counterintuitive predictions for the role of
strength of faith (jor a given contract type), or on the role of religious affiliation and
contract type for a given strength of faith. In this way, these tests suggest substantial
power for the model's predictions. To be clear, the empirical tests indicate the power of
the model's predictions for the relationship between strength of faith and individual
beliefs about contract type based on religious affiliation. In this sense, the tests are about
beliefs concerning contract types, not necessarily the contract types themselves.
The raw data set for the year 1988 consists of 945 observations. There are 569
trusting believers, 321 doubting believers, and 55 nonbelievers. After removing non-
responses on the dependent variable, 891 observations remain. These observations may
be subdivided by strength of faith and religious affiliation. Religious affiliation
observations may be further subdivided by contract type. When the observations are
divided by strength of faith, there are 529 trusting believers, 308 doubting believers, and
54 nonbelievers. When the observations are divided by religious affiliation, there are 514
Protestants, 239 Catholics, 23 Jews, and 1153 respondents answering either none or
other. When the religious affiliation observations are divided, there are 239 respondents
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identifying with an ex post contract, 182 respondents identifying with an ex ante contract,
355 respondents identifying with a covenant and 115 respondents who do not identify
with a contract.
The raw data set for the year 1991 contains 1517 observations of which 918
remain after removing non-responses on the dependent variable and on income. When
observations are divided by strength of faith, there are 481 trusting believers, 264
doubting believers, and 173 nonbelievers. When observations are divided by religious
affiliation, there are 566 Protestants, 244 Catholics, 19 Jews, and 89 answering none or
other. Contractual divisions are as follows: 244 respondents identify with ex post
contracts, 155 respondents identify with ex ante contracts without a penalty, 56
respondents identify with ex ante contracts with a penalty, 374 respondents identify with
a covenant, and 89 with no contract.
In the 1988 data, good works are measured as the level of giving and the
proportion of giving to income for OLS and Tobit specifications. A continuous variable
for income can be proxied by using the mid- range of 20 categories ranging from $2,500
to $65,000. In addition, there is both bottom censoring of the income data at $0 and top
censoring at $60,000. To address these problems, I create a continuous variable with
values at the midpoint of each income category ranging from $5,000 to $65,000
throughout the categories. This way of measuring income likely understates income for
the top range and overstates it for the bottom range.
Dsing the 1991 data, I am able to measure good works as religious attendance.
In the data, attendance is divided into nine categories including never, less than once
per year, once per year, several times per year, once per month, two to three times per
month, nearly every week, every week, and more than once per week. From these
categories, I create a continuous variable which measures the approximate percentage
of yearly attendance and takes a value of zero if the respondent never attends, two if
the respondent attends less than once per year, once per year or several times per year,
twenty-five if the respondent attends once per month or two to three times per month
and 100 if the respondent attends nearly every week, every week, or more than once
per week. Although mean good works are higher for believers, nonbelievers are not
excluded from good works since attendance may be positive for social reasons
unrelated to God. Variable definitions are given in Table 5.
Table 5. Variable Definitions.
VARIABLE DEFThTITION
GN Contributions as percentage of income in 1990 dollars
ATT Approximate percentage ofyearly attendance measured in weeks
INC Income in 1990 dollars
TRSBEL Respondents who know God exists
DBTBEL Respondents who have doubts or believe sometimes or believe in a higher
power but not necessarily a personal God
NONBEL Respondents who either don't believe in God or think there is no way to
find out
EXPST Dummy variable takes a value of 1 if respondent was Catholic
EXANT Dummy variable takes a value of 1 if respondent was Methodist,
Episcopal, Presbyterian, or Jewish (1988 and 1991 samples)
EXAWP Dummy variable takes a value of 1 if respondent identified with an ex ante
contract and did not believe in the devil (1991 sample)
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Table 5. (continued).
VARIABLE DEFINITION
EXPEN Dummy variable takes a value of 1 if respondent identified with an ex ante
contract and believed in the devil (1991 sample)
COY Dummy variable takes a value of 1 if respondent was a Baptist, Missouri
Synod Lutheran, other or non-denominational Protestant
NOC Respondents either answered none or other for religious affiliation
TREXP Trusting believers who identify with ex post contracts
TREXA Trusting believers who identify with ex ante contracts (1988 and 1991
samples)
TRXWP Trusting believers who identify with ex ante contracts without a penalty
(1991 sample)
TRPEN Trusting believers who identify with ex ante contracts with a penalty
(1991 sample)
TRCOV Trusting believers who identify with covenants
DBEXP Doubting believers who identify with ex post contracts
DBEXA Doubting believers who identify with ex ante contracts (1988 and 1991
samples)
DBXWP Doubting believers who identify with ex ante contracts without a penalty
(1991 sample)
DBPEN Doubting believers who identify with ex ante contracts with a penalty
(1991 sample)
DBCOV Doubting believers who identify with covenants.
NBEXP Nonbelievers who enter into an ex post contract
NBEXA Nonbelievers who enter into an ex ante contract (1988 and 1991 samples)
NBXWP Nonbelievers who enter into an ex ante contract without a penalty (1991
sample)
NBPEN Nonbelievers who don't believe in God but believe in the devil (1991
sample)
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Table 5. (continued).
VARIABLE DEFINITION
NBCOV Nonbelievers who enter into covenant
NBNOC Nonbelievers who do not enter into contracts
Descriptive Statistics for each of the variables are reported in table 6 for the years
1988 and 1991. With some exceptions, the statistics indicate that the mean value oftrusting
believer interaction terms is higher than doubting believer interaction terms given a particular
contract, whether an ex post contract, an ex ante contract, or a covenant.
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Table 5 Variables in 1988 and 1991.
Variable
GIV
ATT
INC
TRSBEL
DBTBEL
NONBEL
EXPST
EXANT
EXAWP
EXPEN
COV
NOC
1991
36.1176
(43.5307)
20866.83
(14575.85)
.524
(.4997)
.2876
(.4529)
.1885
(.3913)
.2658
(.442)
.1688
(.3748)
.061
(.2395)
.4074
(.4916)
.0969
(.2961)
1988
.0442
(.2448)
19535.07
(14954.59)
.5937
(.4914)
.3457
(.4759)
.0606
(.2387)
.2682
(.4433)
.2043
(.4034)
.3984
(.4898)
.1291
(.3355)
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Table 6. (continued).
Variable 1991 1988
TREXP .1536 .1571
(.3608) (.3641 )
TREXA .0831
(.2761)
TRXWP .0545
(.2271)
TRPEN .0501
(.2183)
TRCOV .2527 .3176
(.4348) (.4658)
TRNOC .0131 .0359
(.1136) (.1862)
DBEXP .0806 .1033
(.2724) (.3045)
DBEXA .1066
(.3088)
DBXWP .0697
(.2548)
DBPEN .0076
(.087)
DBCOV .0871 .0763
(.2822) (.2657)
DBNOC .0425 .0595
(.2018) (.2367)
NBEXP .0316 .0079
(.175) (.0883)
NBEXA .0146
(.12)
NBXWP .0447
(.2067)
NBPEN .0033
(.0571 )
NBCOV .0675 .0045
(.2511) (.0669)
NBNOC .0414 .0337
(.1993) (.1805)
Observations 918 891
Standard deviations in parentheses
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Estimation Strategy
The model is estimated using proportionate giving and attendance as measures of
good works. For both the 1988 and 1991 data sets, because the dependent variable for
good works (GIV, ATT) is left censored at zero, both OLS and Tobit models are used.
Of the two models, the OLS model is preferred for two reasons. First, observations of
zero on the good works variable are well explained by the strength offaith variables.
Second, the small number of observations for numerous categories is more suited to the
small sample properties of OLS than to Tobit. In the 1988 data set, observations are
fewer than 10% of the sample for nonbelievers, trusting believers under an ex ante
contract, and doubting believers under a covenant. In the 1991 data set, observations are
fewer than 10% of the sample for doubting believers under an ex ante contract without a
penalty and with a penalty. However, to ensure that left censoring is not a significant
source of bias in the OLS estimates, I also estimate a Tobit model for both years.
For two reasons, I begin estimation by using the 1991 data set with attendance as
the dependent variable. First, 1991 is the only year which allows estimation of the fully
specified model with all four types of contracts. Second, only 12 percent of the
observations on attendance are zero whereas 33 percent of the observations on giving are
zero. Next, I estimate a reduced specification which excludes ex ante contracts without a
penalty using the 1988 data. I estimate this reduced specification using attendance and
then proportionate giving, respectively, as measures of the dependent variable and then
compare the differences. To look at both measures of good works simultaneously, I use
the technique of canonical correlation. Canonical correlation is a method that estimates
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the linear combination of dependent variables (in this case, giving and attendance) and
independent variables (strength of belief and contractual variables with their interactions)
that maximizes the correlation between the two. (Theil, 317-318) Canonical correlation is
valuable because it allows for a two dimensional measure of good works consisting of
both giving and attendance rather than a uni-dimensional measure consisting of only one
or the other.
Table 7 shows the regression results for the full specification (1991) in the first
two columns and for the reduced specification (1988) in the next columns. For the full
model, the estimated marginal Tobit effects generally appear to exhibit a similar pattern
for the OLS coefficients, suggesting the bias in OLS is small. The similarity is evident in
two ways. First, significant coefficients in Tobit are generally associated with significant
coefficients in OLS and insignificant coefficients in Tobit are associated with
insignificant coefficients in OLS. Second, in the one exception to this (DBXWP), the
magnitudes are similar. Consequently, I rely on OLS due to its small sample properties.
In the 1988 reduced model, the interactions between believers and ex ante contracts are
significant in OLS but not significant in Tobit. Even so, the differences do not affect the
outcomes of the hypothesis tests for the reduced model as reported in Appendix E.
Consequently, I rely on OLS due to its greater power in small samples.
Table 7. OLS and Tobit Results.
COEFFICIENT OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT
(1991) (1991) (1988) (1988) (1988) (1988)
DEPVAR ATTEND ATTEND ATTEND ATTEND GIVING GIVING
TRSBEL 23.87* 31.394*** 17.50*** 34.487*** 0.00159 0.111 **
(12.4) (12.114) (6.43) (10.338) (0.0076) (0.053)
Table 7. (continued).
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COEFFICIENT OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT
(1991) (1991) (1988) (1988) (1988) (1988)
DBTBEL 1.879 4.995 1.614 15.247 -0.00507 0.044
(5.69) (9.012) (2.27) (9.850) (0.0067) (0.053)
EXPST 13.22* 31.474*** 16.78 42.085*** 0.0546 0.254***
(7.22) (9.104) (13.1) (15.294) (0.040) (0.069)
EXANT 1.374 30.127** -0.00278 0.219***
(2.10) (12.574) (0.0067) (0.060)
EXAWP 29.34*** 47.599***
(8.10) (8.424)
EXPEN 34.62 55.330***
(24.6) (20.540)
COY 39.77*** 52.128*** 23.57 39.821 ** 0.100 0.169
(6.90) (7.835) (21.7) (19.497) (0.094) (0.091)
TREXP 4.650 -8.992 13.28 -8.433 -0.0357 -0.094
,
(14.4) (13.959) (15.0) (16.687) (0.041) (0.075)
TREXA 18.74** -4.840 0.0442*** -0.068
(8.35) (14.470) (0.017) (0.067)
TRXWP -32.62** -29.902**
(15.3) (14.077)
TRPEN -16.77 -23.219
(28.2) (23.471)
TRCOV -18.75 -25.438 4.978 -9.774 -0.0305 -0.056
(14.0) (13.044) (22.8) (20.517) (0.097) (0.096)
DBEXP 2.406 -4.203 8.368 -2.496 -0.0380 -0.053
(9.55) (11.723) (13.9) (16.514) (0.040) (0.075)
DBEXA 12.43*** -1.531 0.0335** -0.026
(4.22) (14.028) (0.013) (0.067)
DBXWP -27.01 *** -21.466
(9.67) (11.290)
DBPEN -28.78 -25.401
(28.3) (25.295)
DBCOV -33.00*** -26.806** -11.38 -11.959 -0.0503 -0.021
(8.85) (10.718) (22.0) (20.578) (0.097) (0.097)
Observations 918 918 891 891 891 891
R-squared/Log L 0.15 -4263.12 .15 -3978.74 .01 -299.85
Notes: Results for good works with and without income are reported in Appendix D. Standard
errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%level; ** significant at 5% level;
*** significant at I% level.
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Table 8 presents estimates based on the canonical correlations. Due to a
singularity in the data, a complete canonical regression with the main effects and
interaction effects cannot be estimated. So, I estimate a reduced regression excluding the
main effects. The results show that individuals appear to tradeoff giving for attendance at
a ratio of 1:2.
Table 8. Canonical Correlation Results (1988).
COEFFICIENT CANON CANON
PERFRQ 0.0237***
(0.0019)
GW2 -0.0469
(0.33)
TRSBEL 1.060*
(0.60)
DBTBEL 0.0983
(0.54)
EXPST 1.010
(0.99)
EXANT 0.0836
I (0.79)
COY 1.415
(1.26)
TREXP 0.809
(LlO)
TREXA 1.130
(0.93)
TRCOV 0.305
(1.34)
DBEXP 0.511
(1.08)
DBEXA 0.748
(0.89)
DBCOV -0.683
(1.33)
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Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis 1 states that ex ante contracts without a penalty don't "work."
Hypothesis 2 states that strength of faith does not matter under ex ante contracts.
Hypothesis 3 states that an ex ante contract with a penalty "works." Hypothesis 4 states
that covenants "work." To test these predictions, I conduct hypothesis tests of the OLS
models. First, I test the full set of predictions for the fully specified model with
interaction terms using the 1991 data. Second, I test predictions omitting ex ante
contracts with a penalty using the 1988 data where those data are not reported.
The results for the fully specified model are displayed in table 9. The
corresponding finite sample F tests are reported in Appendix E, Table E1. Hypothesis 1
is not rejected. Trusting believers have greater attendance under ex post contracts than
under ex ante contracts without a penalty. Hypothesis 2 is also not rejected. Under ex
ante contracts with or without a penalty, strength of faith does not matter for attendance.
Hypothesis 3 is rejected. Attendance for trusting and doubting believers is no higher
under an ex ante contract with a penalty than under an ex ante contract without a penalty.
Hypothesis 4 is not rejected. Good works for believers under covenants are equivalent to
those under ex ante contracts with a penalty.
Table 9. Hypothesis Tests for the Full Model (1991).
Hypothesis
HI :TREXP>TRXWP
H2:TRXWP=DBXWP
H2:TRPEN=DBPEN
H3:TRPEN>TRXWP
H3:DBPEN>DBXWP
H4:DBCOV=DBPEN
H4:TRCOV=TRPEN
RESULT
ACCEPT (i.e.. FAIL TO REJECT)
ACCEPT
ACCEPT
REJECT
REJECT
ACCEPT
ACCEPT
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Table 9. (continued).
Notes: Results of the finite sample F tests are displayed in
Appendix E, Table El.
The results for the reduced model, which excludes penalty variables from the
full model, are displayed in table 10. The corresponding F-tests are reported in
Appendix E, Table E3. Since ex ante contracts with a penalty are not observed in 1988,
only two hypotheses can be tested. Hypothesis 1 is not supported in the reduced
specification. However, this may occur because the test is actually testing whether
trusting believers under ex post contracts produce more good works than under ex ante
contracts with or without a penalty. Hypothesis 2 receives strong support in each
specification. Finite sample F-tests show that good works are equivalent for trusting
and doubting believers under ex ante contracts without a penalty.
Table 10. Hypothesis Tests for the Reduced Model (1988). The dependent variable,
good works, is measured as proportionate giving, attendance, and the linear
combination of the two.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Hypothesis GIV ATT COMBINAnON
Hl:TREXP>TREXA REJECT REJECT REJECT
H2:TREXA=DBEXA ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT
Notes: Results ofthe finite sample F-tests for both the reduced and the canonical
specification are displayed in Appendix E, Table E3.
A summary of the results is displayed in Table 11. The summary of the F-tests is
displayed in Appendix E, Table E9. Hypothesis 1 states that ex ante contracts without a
penalty don't "work." Hypothesis 1 is supported in the full model. Hypothesis 2 states
that strength of faith does not matter under ex ante contracts. It is supported across both
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specifications. Hypothesis 3 states that penalties "work." It is not supported. Believers
do not have greater good works under an ex ante contract with a penalty than under an ex
ante contract without a penalty. Hypothesis 4 states the covenants "work" in the sense
that good works are equivalent to those in an ex ante contract with a penalty-without
requiring a penalty. This hypothesis is not rejected.
Table 11. Summary of Hypothesis Tests. Canonical refers to canonical correlation
estimates.
MODEL
DEPENDENT YAR
FULL
ATT
OLS
(BASE)
REDUCED
ATT
OLS
(BASE)
REDUCED
GIY
OLS
(BASE)
REDUCED
COMPOSITE
CANONICAL
(BASE)
HYPOTHESIS RESULT
HI (l991):TREXP>TRXWP ACCEPT REJECT REJECT REJECT
Hl(1988): TREXP>TREXA
H2(l991):TRXWP=DBXWP ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT
H2(1988):TREXA=DBEXA
H2:TRPEN=DBPEN ACCEPT
H3 :TRPEN>TRXWP REJECT
H3:DBPEN>DBXWP REJECT
H4:TRCOY=TRPEN ACCEPT
H4:DBCOY=DBPEN ACCEPT
Notes: Summary results ofthe finite sample F tests are displayed in Appendix E, Table
E9. Hypotheses I and 2 are tested for full model (TREXP>TRXWP;
TRXWP=DBXWP) and reduced model (TRXWP=DBXWP; TREXA=DBEXA),
Empirical Conclusions
The results of the empirical tests are broadly consistent with the theoretical model
predictions. In the full specification, trusting believers have greater good works under an
ex post contract than under ex ante contract without a penalty when good works is
measured as attendance. Also, good works for believers, whether trusting or doubting,
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are the same under covenants and ex ante contracts with a penalty. More significantly,
counter to the intuition that increased strength of faith leads to increased good works, an
increase in strength of faith is not associated with an increase in good works in ex ante
contracts across all specifications.
The empirical results are thus consistent with incentives to renege in ex ante
contracts. At the heart of the theoretical model is the notion that reneging occurs under
ex ante contracts without a penalty. This sets apart ex ante contracts without a penalty
from ex post contracts in which trusting believers respond to contractual obligations. The
empirical tests show that strength of faith does not matter under ex ante contracts. In
addition, the theoretical model indicates that good works for believers are equivalent
under covenants and ex ante contracts with a penalty.
At the beginning of this dissertation, I posed the question, what is the relationship
between self and God? A preliminary answer to this question, based on these empirical
findings, suggests that all believers renege under ex ante contracts, and thus require
incentives in the form of gifts and rewards to increase good works. For believers,
sanctions are ineffective as a motivation. Empirically, the relationship between self and
God appears to be a mixture of faith and fear.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
This study provides strong evidence of predictable links between religious beliefs
and economic outcomes. For the fully specified model, with attendance as the measure
of good works and the dependent variable, my results suggest that: (1) ex post contracts
"work" (attendance is greater for trusting believers under ex post contracts than under ex
ante contracts without a penalty); (2) strength of faith does not matter (good works are
equivalent for trusting and doubting believers under ex ante contracts); (3) penalties do
not "work" for believers (attendance is no greater for believers under ex ante contracts
with a penalty than under ex ante contracts without a penalty); and (4) covenants "work"
(attendance is the same for believers under covenants as under ex ante contracts without a
penalty).
In addition, the results of the reduced model show that strength of faith does not
matter under ex ante contracts. Good works are no greater for trusting believers than
doubting believers under ex ante contracts regardless of how good works are specified.
This means that strength of faith does not matter under ex ante contracts across all
specifications and models.
APPENDIX A
COMPLETE LISTING OF MODEL VARIABLES
The return for good works (b) that God gives to believers is denoted with
an English lowercase letter and contrasted with humanity's innate return
for C denoted by (0).
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VARIABLE
L
T
h
V
b
Lc
DEFINITION
TOTAL AMOUNT OF COMMON
INPUT DIVIDED BETWEEN LG &Lc '
PENALTY FOR
RENEGING
MARGINAL
PRODUCTIVITY OF
PRODUCING
CONSUMPTION GOODS
MARGINAL UTILITY OF
GOOD WORKS (constant)
SPIRITUAL GIFT, GIVEN
ON CONDITION OF
'FAITH
'CONSUMPTION'
RETURN FOR GOOD
WORKS
INPUT INTO GOOD
WORKS
INPUT INTO
CONSUMPTION GOODS
APPENDIXB
RELIGION/DENOMINATION BY CONTRACTUAL TYPE
CONTRACT RELIGION/DENOMINATION
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COV
EXANT
EXPST
American Baptist
American Baptist Church in USA
National Baptist Convention ofAmerica
National Baptist Convention USA
Southern Baptist
Other Baptist
Baptist-Don't know which
Missouri Synod Lutheran
Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod
African Methodist Episcopal
African Methodist Episcopal Zion
United Methodist
Other Methodist
Methodist-Don't know which
American Lutheran
Lutheran Church in America
Other Lutheran
Evangelical Lutheran
Lutheran-Don't know which
Presbyterian Church in US
Presbyterian-Don't know which
Episcopal
No denomination
Catholic
Other
See page 25 for a list of Variable definitions.
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APPENDIX C
VARIABLES BY YEAR
VARIABLE YEAR
GIV 1988
ATT 1988,1991
INC 1988, 1991
TRSBEL 1988,1991
DBTBEL 1988, 1991
NONBEL 1988, 1991
COY 1988, 1991
EXANT 1988,1991
EXPST 1988, 1991
EXPEN 1991
TRCOV 1988,1991
TREXA 1988,1991
TREXP 1988,1991
TRPEN 1991
DBCOV 1988,1991
DBEXA 1988, 1991
DBEXP 1988, 1991
DBPEN 1991
NBCOV 1988, 1991
NBEXA 1988,1991
NBEXP 1988,1991
NBPEN 1988, 1991
APPENDIXD
REGRESSIONS WITH AND WITHOUT INCOME
OLS regressions with and without income for the years 1991 and 1988.
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COEFF OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1991) (1991) (1988) (1988) (1988) (1988)
DEP VAR: ATT ATT ATT ATT GIVING GIVING
INC 0.000176* 0.000103 -.000002***
(0.0001) (0.00009) (.00000064)
TRSBEL 23.87* 24.96** 17.50*** 17.49*** 0.00159 0.00196
(12.4) (12.2) (6.43) (6.34) (0.0076) (0.011 )
DBTBEL 1.879 1.780 1.614 1.632 -0.00507 -0.00542 I
(5.69) (5.69) (2.27) (2.27) (0.0067) (0.0095)
EXPST 13.22* 12.85* 16.78 17.25 0.0546 0.0455
(7.22) (7.23) (13.1) (13.3) (0.040) (0.035)
EXANT 1.374 -0.135 -0.00278
(2.10) (2.46) (0.0067)
EXAWP 29.34*** 28.42***
(8.10) (8.12)
EXPEN 34.62 35.28 0.0268
(24.6) (25.5) (0.017)
COV 39.77*** 39.47*** 23.57 23.73 0.100 0.0971
(6.90) (6.96) (21.7) (22.2) (0.094) (0.085)
TREXP 4.650 3.763 13.28 12.95 -0.0357 -0.0291
(14.4) (14.2) (15.0) (15.2) (0.041) (0.036)
TREXA 18.74** 20.52** 0.0442*** 0.00947
(8.35) (8.32) (0.017) (0.023)
TRXWP -32.62** -32.83**
(15.3) (15.1)
TRPEN -16.77 -19.07
(28.2) (28.7)
TRCOV -18.75 -19.14 4.978 5.098 -0.0305 -0.0329
(14.0) (13.8) (22.8) (23.2) (0.097) (0.089)
DBEXP 2.406 2.705 8.368 7.828 -0.0380 -0.0275
(9.55) (9.51) (13.9) (14.1) (0.040) (0.035)
OL8 regressions (continued).
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COEFF OL8 OL8 OL8 OL8 OL8 OL8
(1991) (1991) (1988) (1988) (1988) (1988)
DBEXA 12.43*** 13.50*** 0.0335** 0.0125
(4.22) (4.31) (0.013) (0.019)
DBXWP -27.0*** -26.74***
(9.67) (9.66)
DBPEN -28.78 -28.72
(28.3) (29.1)
DBCOV -33.0*** -32.71 *** -11.38 -11.25 -0.0503 -0.0528
(8.85) (8.89) (22.0) (22.5) (0.097) (0.089)
Constant 7.711 ** 4.132 1.933* -0.162 0.00682 0.0478***
(3.72) (4.11) (1.14) (2.12) (0.0066) (0.016)
Observations 918 918 891 891 891 891
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.01 .03
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1
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APPENDIXE
RESULTS OF HYPOTHESIS TESTS
Table El. Results ofF-Tests for the Fully Specified Model.
F(l,903) F(l,902) F(l,884)
OLS OLS OLS
Hypothesis ATTEND ATTEND ATTEND
(BASE) (BASE+INC) (BASE+ALL
CONTROLS)
TREXP=TRXWP 10.39*** 9.97*** 7.07***
TRXWP=DBXWP .16 .20 .04
TRPEN=DBPEN .38 .25 .01
TRPEN=TRXWP .35*** .25 .16
DBPEN=DBXWP .00 .00 .03
TRCOV=TRPEN .01 .00 .01
DBCOV=DBPEN .02 .02 .18
Table E2. Results oft tests for the Fully Specified Model.
t(l) X2 (1) X21 )
TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT
Hypothesis ATTEND ATTEND ATTEND
(BASE) (BASE +INC) (BASE+ALL
CONTROLS)
TREXP=TRXWP 10.63*** 7.07*** 6.77***
TRXWP=DBXWP 1.03 .04 .77
TRPEN=DBPEN .06 .01 .04
TRPEN=TRXWP .33 .16 .09
DBPEN=DBXWP .10 .03 .02
TRCOV=TRPEN .00 .01 .04
DBCOV=DBPEN .00 .18 .07
Table E3. A comparison of finite sample F-tests for the base
specification ofthe reduced model.
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F(1,879)
OLS
F(1,879)
OLS
F(1,890)
OLS
Hypothesis ATTEND GIVING CANONICAL
(BASE)
TREXP=TREXA .14
TREXA=DBEXA .51
Notes: * TREXP<TREXA
(BASE)
3.50*
.30
(BASE)
.08
.35
Table E4. A comparison oft tests for the base specification ofthe
reduced model.
x2 (1) t(l)
TOBIT TOBIT
Hypothesis ATTEND GIVING
(BASE) (BASE)
TREXP=TREXA .07 1.09
TREXA=DBEXA .. 14 .2.59
Table E5. A comparison of finite sample F-tests for the reduced model
with income as a control.
F(1,879) F(1,879) F(1,890)
OLS OLS CANONICAL
Hypothesis ATTEND GIVING COMPOSITE
(BASE+INC)
(BASE+INC) (BASE+INC)
TREXP=TREXA .26 .90 .14
TREXA=DBEXA .63 .02 .44
Table E6. A comparison of X2 tests for the reduced model with income as a control.
t(l)
Hypothesis
TOBIT
ATTEND
TOBIT
GIVING
(BASE+INC)
TREXP=TREXA .16
TREXA=DBEXA .09
(BASE+INC)
.40
2.92*
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Table E7. A comparison of finite sample F-tests for the reduced model
with extensive controls.
F(1,858) F(1,858)
OLS OLS
Hypothesis ATTEND GIVING
(BASE+ALL (BASE+ ALL
CONTROLS) CONTROLS)
TREXP=TREXA .29 .28
TREXA=DBEXA 1.40 .51
Notes: **Reject hypothesis at 5% level
F(1,858)
OLS
CANONICAL
(BASE+ ALL
CONTROLS)
.21
.93
Table E8. A comparison ofX2 tests for the reduced model with extensive controls.
x2 (1) t(l)
TOBIT TOBIT
Hypothesis ATTEND GIVING
(BASE+ALL (BASE+ALL
CONTROLS) CONTROLS)
TREXP=TREXA .30 .05
TREXA=DBEXA .02 1.62
Table E9. Complete summary of finite sample F test results for the base specification of
the full and reduced models. CAN stands for canonical correlation.
MODEL FULL RED RED RED
DEP VARIABLE ATT(1991) ATT(1988) GIV CAN
TREXP=TRXWP 10.39*** .14 3.50* .08
TREXP=TREXA
TRXWP=DBXWP .16 .51 .30 .35
TREXA=DBEXA
TRPEN=DBPEN .38
TRPEN=TRXWP .35***
DBPEN=DBXWP .00
TRCOV=TRPEN .01
DBCOV=DBPEN .02
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APPENDIXF
SCRIPTURAL BACKGROUND FOR THE MODEL
Introduction
The model in the previous section relies heavily on scriptural archetypes for the
relationship between self and God and Judeo-Christian theology. The model also
implicitly suggests the evolution of a sequence offoUf contractual archetypes and the
possibility of three types of believers or nonbelievers, that is, doubting and trusting
believers, and nonbelievers. This appendix provides illustrative examples and a broader
scriptural background for the model. Thus, the scriptural examples are intended only as
an illustrative background for the model.
Old Testament
I begin with two Old Testament examples which involve consumption of
milk and honey from the Promised Land but do not involve transforming faith.
Next, I tum to the'Exodus'. This cohort consists of the Israelites who passed
through the Red Sea and their children who entered into the Promised Land under
Joshua. After this, I consider all the Israelites from the time of Joshua to the time
of King David.
For the final examples, I consider the cohort ofhumanity through history
beginning with Adam and Eve and concluding with the New Testament incarnation
through the time of the apostles. In the final example, nonbelievers and doubting
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believers are identified with Adam and believers with transforming faith are identified
with Jesus.
The exodus
The background ofthe exodus
The story of Israel's exodus out of Egypt and the ex post contract God
makes with Israel on Mt. Sinai is one of the greatest stories of freedom in the
bible. It is the major event in the Torah. The significance and scope of the
Exodus for the people ofIsrael is well summed up in Moses' speech to Israel east
of the Jordan River as they prepare to take possession of the Promised Land.
Ask now about the former days, long before your time,
from the day God created man on the earth; ask from one end of
the heaven to the other. Has anything as great as this ever
happened, or has anything like it ever been heard of? Have any
other people heard the voice of God speaking out of fire, as you
have, and lived? Has any god ever tried to take for himself one
nation out of another nation, by testings, by miraculous signs and
wonders, by war, by a mighty hand and an outstretched arm, or by
great and awesome deeds, like all the things the Lord your God did
for you in Egypt before your very eyes?(Deut.4:32-34)
The story properly begins when God reveals himself orally to Moses as the Lord
(Hebrew, Yhwh) and chooses Moses to lead Israel out of Egypt as recorded in the book
of Exodus. At the same time, the written use of the term Lord begins in the Genesis
account of Adam and Eve. This suggests that the story of Adam and Eve provides
important background for understanding the story of the exodus. In particular, the
narrative in Genesis suggests that one of the consequences of humanity's doubt in God's
promises is the establishment of the institution of slavery. The presence of slavery is first
described in the story of Joseph in the book of Genesis when Joseph's brothers sell him
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into slavery and then expanded in the book of Exodus when Pharaoh, king of Egypt,
takes the entire nation of Israel as slaves.
In the beginning of the book of Exodus, God reveals himself supernaturally to
Moses in a bush which is on fire but is not burnt up. When Moses approaches the
unusual bush, God tells him that the place where he is standing is holy ground and gives
Moses an ex post contract in which he is to command Pharaoh, "let my people go."(Ex
3: 10,18) Moses does not want to accept the contract, arguing that he does not possess the
attributes to accomplish this task and asks God to send someone else to do it. God
overrules Moses, endows him with sufficient attributes to lead Israel out of Egypt, and
appoints his brother Aaron as a helper. God then makes an ex post contract with Israel in
which he tells them he is concerned about them and promises them freedom from slavery
and consumption of 'milk and honey' from the Promised Land in exchange for following
Moses, their deliverer.
Instead of listening to Moses' command, however, Pharaoh makes life harder for
Israel by requiring them to increase production of bricks without straw, and then whips
and beats them for failure to meet specified production levels. Israel responds by
doubting God's promise of freedom and future consumption from the Promised Land.
God's ex ante contract with Israel
To address this problem, God makes an ex ante contract with Israel in which
Israel experiences a series of miracles (an element of V?), which God perfonns against
Egypt conditional upon a promise to keep the Ten Commandments. These miracles take
the fonn of plagues, beginning with afflictions against the land of Egypt and culminating
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in the great miracle ofthe parting of the Red Sea. In this miracle, God parts the waters,
brings Israel safely through, and then turns back the waters upon Pharaoh and Egypt,
drowning the Egyptians in the sea and eliminating both the slavery of Egypt and the
doubt of Israel.
Doubting believers, who remain in doubt through all the plagues, fearful
of what Egypt might do to them, consume this final 'Red Sea' miracle and are
converted. As evidence of this conversion, Moses leads all the believers in a
song. The first two lines are:
I will sing unto the Lord, for he has triumphed gloriously: horse and rider thrown
into the sea.
The Lord is my strength and my song, he has become my salvation: he is my God,
and my father's God, and I will exalt him.(Ex.l5:1-3)
The ex ante contract with a penalty
After the miracle of the Red Sea, Israel begins its journey to the Promised Land.
During this journey, God appears to Moses on Mt. Sinai. Moses stays on Mt. Sinai with
God for forty days and forty nights and receives both the Ten Commandments and
provisions for temporary violations of the Ten Commandments. Instead of keeping the
Ten Commandments satisfactorily, Israel permanently violates the Ten Commandments,
frequently reneging and complaining virtually the entire trip. On one occasion, Moses
chooses twelve men to spy out the land and bring back some of its agricultural produce.
The men return with a cluster of grapes and a positive report that the land is flowing with
milk and honey. They also report that the people of the land are strong, tall, and live in
fortified cities. Instead of responding in compliance with the Ten Commandments, Israel
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complains and quarrels against Moses for leading them into 'certain' death. As a
consequence, God penalizes Israel by refusing to allow them to enter the Promised Land.
Even Moses is not allowed to enter in spite of his special friendship with God, his
meekness, and his example. The consequence of this penalty is a renewed commitment
on the part of the remaining Israelites to keep the Ten Commandments under Moses and
Joshua and an increase in good works.
God's covenant with Joshua and Israel
After the death ofMoses, God renews his commitment to Israel by entering into
an ex post contract and a covenant with Israel. God's contract with Israel requires that
Israel take complete possession of the Promised Land, fighting against the inhabitants of
the land. God's covenant with Israel gives them spiritual calm in the land upon condition
of transforming faith.
In order to aid Israel in their contractual quest, God promises to fight for them. If
Israel does what God says, they will enjoy consumption of 'milk and honey' from the
entire land. To carry out his promise, God makes the walls of the city of Jericho fall
inward allowing Israel to storm the city and take it. God then continues to give Israel the
assistance needed to take possession of the Promised Land. Beginning with the city
immediately west of the Jordan river, Jericho, Israel conquers "all the land, the hills, and
all the south country, and all the land of Goshen, and the valley, and the plain, and the
mountains and valleys of Israel." God then provides rest to Israel from all its enemies and
spiritual peace for Israelites who possess transforming faith and know that "not one of
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God's good promises will fail." Thus, through this contract, Israel takes all the land God
had promised them and has respite from war.
In order to ensure not only physical safety, but also spiritual rest, God enters into
a covenant with Israel in which psychological rest is granted to Israel upon condition of
transforming faith. This psychological rest is a rest from worry that God's promises will
fail and possession of the land will only be temporary. Israelites who enter into this
psychological rest know that "not one of God's good promises will fail" and look forward
to continuing peace under Joshua's leadership. Thus, through the covenant, Israel gains
access to the additional utility afforded by transforming faith in God's protection and
care.
From Joshua to David
God's ex post contract with Israel after Joshua
The story of God's relationship with Israel between the time of Joshua and
the time of David primarily revolves around Israel's attempts to take complete
possession of the land. After Joshua dies, possession of the land is not automatic.
Israel's neighbors have contracts with their own gods and are not friendly toward
Israel; the particular ex post contract God makes with Israel promises them
continuing additional consumption on the condition that they remain faithful to
their divine contract and don't enter into the divine contracts with the surrounding
nations. Some of the twelve tribes of Israel keep this commitment, but other
tribes fail to keep this contract, because they doubt God's promise to Israel of
additional consumption and prefer the contracts ofthe nations around them. The
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situation grows increasingly worse and virtually all the Israelites doubt God's
promises and enter into the divine contracts of the nations around them.
God's ex ante covenant with Israel during the Judges' time
God addresses this problem by making a series of ex ante contracts with Israel
over a course of approximately 350 years in which God provides additional consumption
through a judge or leader who enables Israel to win against its enemies. This provision of
judges enables successive generations of Israelites to convert from doubting faith to
trusting faith as they witness the additional consumption which God provides. The book
ofjudges describes the triumphs of Israel under these judges. Samson is perhaps the
most famous judge because he is given super strength by God which enables him to
defeat the enemies of Israel and to provide additional consumption for Israel; the story of
Samson and Delilah is a literary classic in which Delilah discovers that the secret of
Samson's strength is his long hair and then gets him to shave his hair thus making him
like any other man. Not to be frustrated, Samson recovers his strength as his hair grows
back and brings down a mighty wall on top of the Philistines and himself thus ironically
killing more people through his death than he did in his life. Samson's ironic end is a
signal that these ex ante contracts are not ultimately a satisfactory solution to the problem
of reneging.
An ex ante contract with penalty
The difficulty of the ex ante contracts which Israel enters into with God is that the
additional consumption comes only when the judge is alive. After the death of the judge,
Israel always reneges. In order to address this problem, God penalizes Israel by reducing
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their consumption and subjecting them to slavery. This penalty leads Israel to seek God
and increase their input into good works by fighting against their neighbors and taking
possession ofthe land. This pattern of ex ante consumption during the life of the judge
and reneging is so frequent that the author of the book ofjudges describes it as a pattern
ofbehavior for Israel over the entire time period. The pattern is as follows:
(1) A generation ofIsraelites arise who don't believe God's promises
(2) Israel enters into contracts with the neighbors and their gods
(3) God penalizes Israel, subjecting them to slavery
(4) Israel accepts God's contract and rejects the neighbors contracts
(5) God provides ajudge for Israel who brings additional consumption
(6) The judge dies and the next generation repeats the cycle
Eventually, during the time of a judge named Samuel, Israel becomes tired of
judges and requests a divine contract which resembles the nations around them. This
means appointing a king to lead them in battle. God is not pleased with this request but
abides by it and provides a king for Israel, determining to enter into a covenant and a
contract with the king and with Israel.
A contract and a covenant with Israel and King David
The king that God appoints to accomplish this is named David; he is a small
shepherd boy from the smallest tribe of Israel who possesses transforming faith. God
chooses David to demonstrate that Israel is best off not with a big strong leader but upon
condition oftransfonning faith. David's classic fight with Goliath and his victory over
Goliath with merely a slingshot and some stones demonstrate this truth. After this
victory, David defeats various nations who have been oppressing Israel and establishes
centralized worship in Jerusalem extending Israel's possession of the land to the greatest
limits in its history. David and his mighty fighters possess transforming faith and make
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this happen as they carry out God's contract with them and with Israel. The additional
psychic utility received by believers with transforming faith comes in the form of a
promise; God promises to give all believers with transforming faith a share in an
everlasting dynasty made with David and his descendants. Evidence of this additional
utility is seen in David's response to God's promise:
How great you are, 0 Sovereign Lord! There is no one like
you, and there is no God but you, as we have heard with our own
ears. And who is like your people Israel-the one nation on earth
that God went out to redeem as a people for himself, and to make a
name for himself, and to perform great and awesome wonders by
driving out nations and their gods from before your people, whom
you redeemed from Egypt? You have established your people
Israel as your very own forever, and you, 0 Lord, have become
their God. And now, Lord God, keep forever the promise you
have made concerning your servant and his house. Do as you
promised, so that your name will be great forever.
Evidence of this additional utility for all believers with transforming faith is given
in the words of an Israelite, Ethan the Ezrahite:
I will sing ofthe Lord's great love forever; with my mouth I will
make known your faithfulness through all generations. I will
declare that your love stands firm forever, that you established
your faithfulness in heaven itself. You said, "I have made a
covenant with my chosen one, I have sworn to David my servant, I
will establish your line forever and make your throne firm through
all generations.(Psalm 89: 1-4)
•New Testament
Jesus, the apostles, and humanity
One of the fundamental theological tensions in the New Testament documents is
the question of when transforming faith actually begins and when reneging ends. On the
one hand, transforming faith is not acquired until believers reach perfection in the
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afterlife because it is only in the afterlife when reneging ends. On the other hand,
reneging ends at the event of Pentecost when the apostles receive the gift of transforming
faith and experience the spiritual increase to utility associated with this gift. From that
point onward, the apostles, though they are imperfect, satisfactorily do the good works
Jesus requires and do not deny their knowledge of Jesus, as they did during the time of
his death. Similarly, humans who truly believe the apostles message also satisfactorily
do the good works Jesus requires.
This example describes the sequence of arrangements under the assumption that
believers acquire transforming faith before the afterlife. In particular, the apostles
experience a spiritual gift after the event of Pentecost through participation in the 'Lord's
supper.' The next example describes the sequence of arrangements from contract to
covenant under the assumption that believers acquire transforming faith only when they
are perfect in the afterlife.
The stories of Jesus in the gospels indicate that Jesus chooses a particular group of
twelve followers requiring them to leave their homes, their possessions, their families,
and their neighborhoods to follow him in a larger mission throughout the region of Israel.
In addition to these twelve followers, called apostles, a group of women support Jesus out
of their means and follow him as well. The ex post contract Jesus gives to his followers
requires them to identify them with him and to do to others what they would have others
do to them. The most difficult test of this contract consists of identifying with him during
his humiliating work when he dies on the cross under the condemnation of the Roman
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Government and the Jewish Sanhedrin. Completion of these requirements is rewarded
with consumption of a special meal.
In spite of the willingness and commitment of Jesus' apostles and his followers to
identify with him, the gospels indicate that his followers expect Jesus to give an
immediate consumption reward through the establishment of a city in fulfillment of Old
Testament promises of a physical land. Jesus' followers do not understand that Jesus
promises a spiritual reward for trusting belief. The result of this misunderstanding is that
his followers do not identify with him during the period between his public humiliation
and his re-appearance from death and do not do for him what he did for them. Instead,
the gospels indicate that his followers doubt his promise.
The Passover
Jesus nevertheless makes an ex ante contract with the apostles in which they
consume his miracles (an element of V?) and participate in the Passover before his death.
The Passover is described in three different gospels. The account from the gospel
of Luke follows:
He replied, "As you enter the city, a man carrying a jar of water
will meet you. Follow him to the house that he enters, and say to
the owner of the house, 'The teacher asks: Where is the guest
room, where I may eat the Passover with my disciples?' He will
show you a large upper room, all furnished. Make preparations
there. They left and found things just as Jesus had told them. So
they prepared the Passover.
When the hour came, Jesus and his apostles reclined at the table.
And he said to them, "I have eagerly desired to eat this Passover
with you before I suffer. For I tell you, I will not eat it again until
it finds fulfillment in the kingdom of God." After taking the cup,
he gave thanks and said, "Take this and divide it among you. For I
tell you I will not drink again of the fruit of the vine until the
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kingdom of God comes." And he took bread, gave thanks and
broke it, and gave it to them, saying, "This is my body given for
you; do this in remembrance of me." In the same way, after the
supper he took the cup, saying, "This cup is the new covenant in
my blood, which is poured out for you.(Luke 22: 10-20)
There are features in this account which are helpful for describing the ex ante
contract. Even though the apostles do not have transforming faith when Jesus says these
words, Jesus looks forward to the time when they will receive the Passover as a covenant
meal, termed the "Lord's Supper", in which they possess transforming faith. Thus, in
addition, this ex ante contract looks forward to the day when the apostles will have
transforming faith.
In spite of the Passover meal, the apostles still do not possess the transforming
faith necessary to eliminate reneging. As a penalty, God subjects the apostles to a
penalty of remorse and spiritual deprivation between the period of time between Jesus'
death and his re-appearance from death. After Jesus reappears from death, he speaks
with the apostles for a period of forty days. During this time, he enters into a contract
with the apostles and other believers in which he requires them to speak with others about
his death, re-appearance from death, and entrance into an infinite afterlife with God. He
also tells the believers to gather in Jerusalem to await the event of Pentecost, at which
time everyone will obtain transforming faith. By gathering in Jerusalem, believers renew
their good works after the penalty.
When the event ofPentecost occurs, the apostles obtain transforming faith. After
this event, believers obtain transforming faith through the apostles' activity. In
particular, the apostles begin to administer the covenant of the 'Lord's Supper' and
believers experience assurance and pleasure as they take the elements of the bread and
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the wine which serve as a reminder of forgiveness for reneging. When combined with
the contract Jesus makes with his followers, the covenant meal of the Lord's Supper
brings spiritual blessing both in the present and in the future. This bliss is attainable
neither during neither the Old Testament period nor the New Testament period, apart
from transforming faith.
Overview
The broadest and most comprehensive example in the scriptures ofthe sequence
of the model begins with God's ex post contract with Adam and Eve and then Old
Testament humanity, continues with God's ex ante contract with New Testament
humanity and concludes with God's covenant at the end of history. The richness of
God's dealings with humanity are conveyed through the consumption of the tree of life
by Adam and Eve, the consumption of 'milk and honey' by the people of Israel and the
consumption of a heavenly tree oflife at history's end.
The initial offer of an ex post contract: the story of Adam and Eve
The story of Adam is described in the first three chapters of the book of Genesis.
In chapter one, God creates Adam and Eve and gives them similar attributes to his own.
In particular, God gives Adam and Eve the attributes ofgoodness and power. Goodness
expresses itself in the performance of good works and power expresses itself in
productive agricultural activity on the earth. In addition to these attributes, Adam and
Eve also possess free-will. This means that Adam and Eve may pursue their own
interests instead of God's interests and may reduce time spent in good works from the
divine ideal if given the right incentive to do so.
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In chapter two, God creates a garden in Eden as a place for Adam and Eve to live.
In the garden of Eden, God places trees and plants that are pleasing to the eye and good
for food so that Adam has an incentive to eat from the trees and plants. Of these trees
and plants, God places one tree, the tree oflife, which potentially yields earthly
consumption for an infinite period of time. God also places a tree, the tree ofthe
knowledge of good and evil, in the garden. God then gives Adam and Eve a specific ex
post contract (with a penalty) in which they are free to eat from any tree in the garden of
Eden, but must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. God promises to
give Adam and Eve liberty to enjoy fruit from the tree and to live for eternity, but
threatens them with death ifhe does not.
In chapter three, the writer describes a third party, the serpent, who suggests to
Adam and Eve an alternative (disingenuous) contract in which they may gain knowledge
if they eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. This offer leads to doubt
concerning God's promise in withholding this source of consumption. Moreover, since
the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is pleasing to the eye and attractive, Adam and
eat from the tree and reduce their input into the good work of tending God's gift of Eden
The extension ofthe ex post contract: the story of Old Testament humanity
The scriptures indicate that Adam and Eve's doubt of God's promise and reduced
input into good works is conveyed to all humanity. While the specific form of the
contractual prohibition---don't eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil-is
unique to Adam and Eve, the contract is 'reestablished' for future generations of humans
through the Ten Commandments. Just as God required perfect obedience from Adam
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and Eve through the prohibition as a condition for heavenly life, God requires perfect
obedience to the Ten Commandments as a condition for a heavenly life. Just as Adam
and Eve reduce input into good works by eating from the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil and forfeit the right to eat from the tree of life, so Old Testament humanity
reduce input into good works by violating the Ten Commandments and forfeits their
right to consume the 'milk and honey' from the Promised Land. The historical books of
Kings and Chronicles and the Major and Minor Prophets describe this forfeiture as an
exile. Interestingly, even for people who are described in exemplary terms in the Old
Testament and are unlike Israel, the Ten Commandments are violated; Noah plants a
vineyard and gets drunk, Abraham lies and sleeps with his wife's handmaiden, Moses
gets angry at Israel and at God, and David commits adultery. The implication of Adam
and Eve's doubt is significant: no trusting believers are the exception in Old Testament
humanity; with the prominent exception of Abraham and the prophets, Old Testament
humanity consists primarily of doubting believers and nonbelievers. This condition sets
the stage for God's offer of an ex ante contract with humanity.
An ex ante contract for New Testament humanity: stories from the Gospels
In order to reach doubting believers, God offers humanity an ex ante contract in
which God promises salvation conditional on doing good works which Jesus assigns.
The good works Jesus assigns may be summed up in the golden rule: do unto others
what you would have them do to you. Consumption of a meal is figurative but
nonetheless real according to the gospel writers. For example, Jesus himself speaks of
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eating of the fruit of the vine in God's heavenly kingdom.(Mt.26:29; Mk.14:25;
Lk.22: 18)
This consumption of a meal occurs in two ways in the gospels. First, it occurs
when humans 'taste and see' Jesus' miraculous activity. For example, consumption takes
place when the apostles see Jesus change water into wine, when they watch him feed
5,000 people with only a few pieces offish and a few loaves of bread, when a woman
who has been bleeding for twelve years is suddenly healed, when a man born blind sees,
when a leper is cured ofhis skin disease, when doubting Thomas touches Jesus and when
the apostles eat fish with Jesus after his appearance from death. Second and more
significantly, seeing and tasting of the heavenly meal occurs in the context of the
Passover, as mentioned above In contrast to the Passover in the previous example which
occurred in past history, the Passover meal here is publicly observable whenever
churches meet on earth.
The result of consumption of the Passover is the conversion ofdoubting believers
and the creation of a community composed of all humans who enjoy consumption ofthe
Lord's Supper. This conversion does not eliminate reneging. Believers may renege
because they do not possess transforming faith. As an example, the gospel of Matthew
describes Jesus' prediction of the apostles' reneging in the following way: After the Last
Supper, Jesus says, "this very night you will all fall away on account of me." Matthew
later records Peter's denial of Jesus in fulfillment of this prediction. This denial of Jesus
and falling away of believers constitutes a reneging of the apostles' promise to follow
Jesus, and a reduction in the input to good works.
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The covenant
As a result of this blinding, Saul's name and title are changed to the
apostle Paul and he commits himself to establishing communities of faith
throughout the Mediterranean region. Paul's goal is ultimately to establish a
community of faith in Rome, a goal which Paul reaches according to the book of
Acts. Thus, the penalty of blinding issues forth in an increase in good works.
A somewhat humorous example of reneging and asymmetric information occurs
with regard to two believers on a road going to a village called Emmaus, about seven
miles from Jerusalem. On this road, Jesus appears after his death walking with a man
named Cleopas and a friend ofhis. Jesus asks both men what they are discussing and
they answer with downcast faces, "Are you only a visitor to Jerusalem and do not know
the things that have happened there in these days?" The men then proceed to inform Jesus
about himself without recognizing him. The time they spend doing this reduces their
input into good works. After some time of this, Jesus penalizes them for their ignorance
by telling them how foolish and slow ofheart they are for ignoring the predictions of the
prophets concerning his suffering and entrance into heaven. Still they do not recognize
him. Finally, Jesus eats a meal with them and they recognize him after he breaks bread
and gives thanks to God for it. This recognition leads to an increase in good works, as
they presumably speak to others of their experience together. These examples show that
while penalties can eliminate reneging, there is still an opportunity for Pareto
improvement via transforming faith.
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